UNDER FIRE - U.S. Army soldiers take cover as they receive fire on a riverbed near Combat Outpost Delorean in Bala Murghab in Afghanistan's Baghdis province, Jan. 9, 2011. The soldiers are assigned to the 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin WallaceWhen Andrew Exum and Col. Paul Gentile criticize David Petraeus’ counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, I purse my lips.
When retired Marine General Bing West says that “hearts and minds” is getting us nowhere, I pay attention:
(The) focus has to be on building Afghan forces that can defeat the Taliban–and I’ve seen it done. Early last year, at the start of the push into the district of Marja, just west of Nawa, there weren’t enough U.S. troops to control the whole area. A team of 10 seasoned U.S. Special Forces advisers was supporting an entire Afghan battalion in the offensive. It wasn’t working: the Special Forces team lacked the manpower to provide advice, accompany patrols, clear IEDs, and perform all their other essential tasks, especially because Afghan troops tend to be reluctant to engage the Taliban, who fight with the cunning and ferocity of the Apaches in the 1880s.
Read more ....My Comment: I have been a critic of Afghan war strategy since 2004/2005. It is reassuring to see the big heavyweights now wading in and making their opinions known.