General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have been able to get, have less than 10,000 Men in the Jerseys and on board of Transports at Amboy: Ours does not exceed 4,000: His are well disciplined, well Officered, and well appointed: Ours raw Militia, badly Officered, and under no Government. His numbers cannot, in any short time, be augmented: Ours must very considerably, and by such Troops as we can have some reliance on, or the Game is at an End. His situation with respect to Horses and Forage is bad, very bad, I believe; but will it be better? No; on the contrary, worse, and therefore, an inducement, if no other, to shift Quarters. General Howe's informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted with all these circumstances, to suffer him to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, then, can he miss so favourable an opportunity of striking a capital stroke against a City, from whence we derive so many advantages, the carrying of which would give such eclat to his Arms and strike such a damp upon ours? Nor is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined. All the heavy Baggage of the Army; their Salt Provisions and Flour; their Stores, &ca. might go round by Water; whilst their superior numbers would enable them to make a sweep of the Horses for many Miles round about them (not already taken off by us).
Sunday, March 2, 2008