U.S. Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, RCT 2nd Battalion 8th Marines Echo Co., meet with Afghan villagers after driving Taliban fighters from the center of the village in Mian Poshteh, Afghanistan, on July 5, 2009. Joe Raedle / GettyFrom Time Magazine:
Pakistan is not betting on a U.S. victory in Afghanistan, nor is it going out of its way to help achieve one. Instead, say analysts and former top officials in Islamabad, Pakistan views the conflict in Afghanistan through the lens of its own national interests and its conflict with India — and it will act accordingly, prioritizing securing its own interests in Afghanistan's future. And that could be bad news for a U.S.-led military campaign that depends on Pakistan's help for thwarting the Afghan insurgency.
Pakistan officials expressed anxiety two weeks ago when 4,000 U.S. Marines were sent into Helmand province in the first major offensive under the command of President Barack Obama's new Afghanistan commander, General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal was forced to visit Pakistan on July 26 to allay its security chiefs' fears that a squeeze on Taliban militants in Helmand could push them across the border and further destabilize Pakistan.
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My Comment: Throughout the history of this blog we have been listing numerous instances of Pakistani duplicity on what they say to the U.S., and what they are actually doing on the ground. The idea that Pakistan is balking at the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan should be no surprise .... for some Pakistanis it is their allies that we are killing in the countryside.
Another problem with Pakistan is that (on many national security issues) the impression has been given that there are many factions at work within the Pakistani Government itself. While one faction would condemn U.S. Predator strikes in their country, another faction obviously provide the logistics and intelligence to conduct such strikes. This contradictory policy is evident towards the Afghan campaign by the Pakistani Government media releases on this war. One side supports .... the other side condemns.
In the end, our concern should be on the following issue .... will Pakistan continue to support us in our war against the Taliban. If they do not, our only lever on them resides on the billions in aid that they receive from the United States. This can obviously be used as an inducement for cooperation (and it has been used in past negotiations) .... but this inducement is something that we must accept will be done reluctantly and slowly by our Pakistani allies.