The Atlantic:Why the counterinsurgency tactics that seem to have worked so well in Iraq could backfire in Pakistan
Last year, in the town of Dera Ismail Khan, near South Waziristan, a Pakistani friend of mine joined a gang—a “peace force,” he called it, but it sounded like a gang to me. The Taliban, flushed from Afghanistan into Pakistan's tribal areas, had begun to spread out of the tribal areas, and to terrorize residents and attack police stations in places like Dera Ismail Khan. Until gangs (or lashkars) like my friend’s formed, not even the police dared to stand against the Taliban. Now, just a year later, posses and tribal militias are the backbone of Pakistan’s aggressive new counterinsurgency campaign. The use of the lashkars hopes to mimic the
Last year, in the town of Dera Ismail Khan, near South Waziristan, a Pakistani friend of mine joined a gang—a “peace force,” he called it, but it sounded like a gang to me. The Taliban, flushed from Afghanistan into Pakistan's tribal areas, had begun to spread out of the tribal areas, and to terrorize residents and attack police stations in places like Dera Ismail Khan. Until gangs (or lashkars) like my friend’s formed, not even the police dared to stand against the Taliban. Now, just a year later, posses and tribal militias are the backbone of Pakistan’s aggressive new counterinsurgency campaign. The use of the lashkars hopes to mimic the
Last year, in the town of Dera Ismail Khan, near South Waziristan, a Pakistani friend of mine joined a gang—a “peace force,” he called it, but it sounded like a gang to me. The Taliban, flushed from Afghanistan into Pakistan's tribal areas, had begun to spread out of the tribal areas, and to terrorize residents and attack police stations in places like Dera Ismail Khan. Until gangs (or lashkars) like my friend’s formed, not even the police dared to stand against the Taliban. Now, just a year later, posses and tribal militias are the backbone of Pakistan’s aggressive new counterinsurgency campaign. The use of the lashkars hopes to mimic the Anbar Awakening in Iraq, where Sunni tribes left the insurgency and banded together with the U.S. military to drive out al-Qaeda. But will feuding gangs accomplish American security goals, or create even nastier problems down the road?
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My Comment: This article examines the tribal intricacies of Pakistani alliances and conflicts in the Tribal Areas .... a must read article for those who are following this conflict closely.
Read more ....
My Comment: This article examines the tribal intricacies of Pakistani alliances and conflicts in the Tribal Areas .... a must read article for those who are following this conflict closely.